This article reassesses Italy’s diplomacy during the Eastern Crisis (1875–1879), situating the young kingdom within the hierarchical structures and strategic constraints of the late-nineteenth-century European Concert. Although formally a great power, Italy lacked the coercive and diplomatic leverage needed to shape Balkan outcomes independently. The crisis compelled Italian policymakers – especially the Historical Left – to confront the implications of Austro-Hungarian expansion in Bosnia – Herzegovina and to reconcile Risorgimento – derived ideological commitments with the imperatives of security and status. Their response combined support for Balkan national movements with the pursuit of compensations, a strategy linking Italian security to potential territorial adjustments. The study draws on diplomatic correspondence, ministerial papers, and contemporary political writings to reconstruct Italian decision – making. Special attention is given to the role of Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati, whose memoranda and interventions reveal some of the intellectual foundations of Italy’s Balkan policy. Diplomatic marginalization at the Congress of Berlin ultimately exposed the limits of Italy’s ambitions and accelerated its shift toward a more pragmatic alignment, culminating in the Triple Alliance.